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LEGAL REALISM AND HISTORICAL 
METHOD: J. WILLARD HURST AND 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 
Stephen Diamond* 
LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES. By James 
Willard Hurst. Ithaca, New York. Cornell University Press. 1977. 
Pp. 318. $17 .50. . 
For many years, J. Willard Hurst has been the dominant 
figure in American legal history. He is one of the few legal histori-
ans whose work has been enthusiastically received both by profes-
sional historians and by lawyers. Historians have traditionally 
insisted upon a research monograph as an entrance credential 
into their community and Hurst has produced a massive and 
impressive example of such a work.1 ffurst and his students have 
analyzed in detail the interaction between law and particular 
economic activities in nineteenth-century Wisconsin.2 
Lawyers, on the other hand, have typically applauded histo-
ries of their subject that are broad in scope, believing that with-
out great effort (and thus usually with little attention to primary 
materials), they can grasp the main themes in the evolution of 
their discipline. Such synoptic overviews have frequently been 
presented first as a series of lectures, among the most notable 
being works by Holmes, by Pound, and by Gilmore.3 · 
Hurst has himself contributed greatly to this tradition. In 
Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century 
United States (1956) he summed up a century of legal develop-
ment in the phrase, "the release of energy"-a theme now famil-
iar even to those who have not read Hurst's book. In Law and 
Social Process in United States History (1960) the scope was even 
broader-the entire national period of American history-as was 
his task understanding the role of law in America. Hurst's most 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
B.A. 1967, Swarthmore College; M.A. 1968, J.D., Ph.D. 1976, Harvard University. 
1. J. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH! THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE WISCONSIN 
LUMBER INDUSTRY (1964) [hereinafter cited as LAw AND ECONOMIC GROWTH], 
2. The list of such works includes L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965); R. 
HUNT, LAW AND LOCOMOTIVES (1958); S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1960); G. 
KUEHNL, THE WISCONSIN BUSINESS CORPORATION (1959); AND J, LAKE, LAW AND MINERAL 
WEALTH: THE LEGAL PROFILE OF THE WISCONSIN MINING INDUSTRY (1962). 
3. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN 
LAW (1938); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). 
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recent book, Law and Social Order in the United States, 4 is an 
equally ambitious effort. Not surprisingly, much of it is a reca-
pitulation and condensation of his earlier works, which are 
frequently cited in the footnotes. 
Since Hurst has so significantly determined the direction 
and shaped the structure of recent writing about American legal 
history, it is perhaps somewhat difficult to remember that he too 
was the product of a certain time, of certain attitudes and inter-
ests, in American legal studies. Hurst is in many ways the prod-
uct of legal realism, loosely defined. Like the realists, he has 
emphasized the relationship between law and society; legal his-
tory could not simply chronicle the emergence and development 
of legal doctrines, nor treat them largely as intellectual insights 
divorced from the actual world in which they occurred. Hurst, 
like the realists, minimizes the autonomy of law; law rather re-
flects changes in society, most often or most critically, changes 
in the economy. With realism, "Cases & Mate:i;ials on ... " re-
placed "Cases on ... " as the standard law textbook title. This 
often, however, meant only the inclusion of descriptions of the 
legislative or administrative process. This approach broadened 
the scope of legal research, but preserved, as the domain of legal 
academics, law as a subject distinct from the social sciences in 
general. 
Much like the realists, Hurst, even as he insists that law be 
seen in a larger social context, devotes himself almost entirely to 
an analysis of legal materials. He examines trial court results, 
statutory materials, and executive acttons, particularly those 
taken by administrative agencies as well as appellate opinions. In 
doing so he at least implicitly adopts Roscoe Pound's rather for-
mal definition of law as the product of just such governmental 
institutions, as the systematic application of force by politically 
organized society. Hurst calls this "the operation of distinctive 
. . . legal agencies. "5 
Hurst similarly reflects the realist denigration of the impor-
tance of courts, as against other branches of government, in the 
creation of law.6 This attitude described both the real and the 
ideal to many liberal academics in the 1930s, as it was a conclu-
sion which supported opposition to judicial interference with leg-
islative decisions. Hurst somewhat anachronistically continues to 
insist that the courts are relatively unimportant in spite of the 
clear evidence of the growing influence of federal courts over more 
4. J. HURST, LAW AND SocIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES (1977) [hereinafter cited 
as LAW AND SocIAL ORDER]. 
5. Id. at 25. 
6. Id. at 38, 100, 132-43, 186-87. 
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and more aspects of contemporary American society.7 
Hurst again reflects the realist tradition in his emphasis 
upon the relationship between law and the market and his rela-
tive lack of interest in other social institutions. Although Hurst 
has written at length about the American commitment to indi-
vidualism, particularly as it relates to economic behavior, he has 
almost entirely ignored the family and religion, both institutions 
whose study would test the depth and breadth of this commit-
ment. Hurst assumes that, after 1800, the market was the sole 
object of interest for Americans, apparently because, in the 
nineteenth century, they concentrated entirely upon accumulat-
ing wealth, and in the twentieth century upon enjoying what it 
brought.8 
·other issues, however, did hold the attention of Americans. 
The nature and role of government was still problematic, and the 
frequent state constitutional conventions attest to strong yet 
divided opinions about government beyond its effect on the 
market. 9 Suffrage, apportionment, slavery, prohibition, and 
civil rights were all at various times issues of great moment, and 
ones to which Hurst devotes little attention. It has been noted 
that Hurst's focus upon the relation between law and the market 
-a subject on which he has shaped the structure of subsequent 
research and analysis-minimizes any harmful consequences of 
his failure to use extra-legal materials. 10 The legal materials 
themselves present a relatively clear picture of economic behav-
ior-despite the cautioning of realists and their descendants that 
contract law in the abstract is often a poor guide to business 
behavior. The relation between law and the family, a social insti-
tution still relatively less influenced by and described in legal 
materials, could not be so studied without greater recourse to 
extra-legal sources. 
Law and the Social Order recapitulates the sequence of 
Hurst's publications. The book is divided into four chapters. The 
first presents a strategy for legal history; the second records the 
development of legal agencies in America; the last two chapters 
7. See G. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 15. It is not unfair to emphasize here the recent 
influence of federal courts because Hurst focuses his presentation of twentieth-century 
developments on national, rather than state, law. 
8. LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 4, at 125. See Scheiber, At the Borderland of 
Law and Economic History: The Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HlsT. REV, 744, 
752 (1970). 
9. Scheiber, supra note 8, at 752-53. 
10. See Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal 
Historiography, 10 LAw & Socv. REv. 9, 52-53 (1975). 
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finally turn to the substance of legal doctrine. Hurst first pub-
lished "Legal History: A Research Program";11 he next wrote The 
Growth of American Law; The Law Makers (1950), a lengthy 
history of the development of the branches of government; and 
then in Law and Economic Growth and, in a more discursive 
form, in Ldw and the Conditions of Freedom (1956), he examined 
legal decisions themselves rather than the bodies that made 
them. 
In Chapter I, in which Hurst attempts to define the subject 
of legal history, his adoption of Pound's approach to law as the 
product of governmental institutions has the merit of limiting the 
scope of the legal historian's enterprise. It does, however, confine 
a scholar who insists that law be examined in relation to society 
in general. Hurst recognizes this, and thus, includes a section in 
this chapter entitled, "Although the operation of legal agencies 
provided the core of legal history, realism requires also a history 
of law's relation to other institutions and ideas." Hurst here 
avoids the pitfalls of an unduly restrictive definition of his sub-
ject, but does so at a level of abstraction that leaves little content 
to the generalizations that remain. 
There are other instances in which Hurst presents a broad 
principle and then qualifies it with its negation. He reiterates his 
view that the principle underlying much nineteenth-century law 
was the "release of energy," a belief in individualism and in en-
trepreneurial activity as the basis of economic growth. But he 
does not conclude with such a sweeping overstatement. He also 
finds in nineteenth-century law the principle of constitution-
alism, "a stubbornly persistent demand that all organized power 
be accountable to others than the immediate powerholders for the 
quality of the ends and means of using power. "12 This principle, 
which emerged as a limitation on governmental power, was also 
applied to private power. Hurst has thus provided a principle 
and a counter-principle. Individual activity is to be encouraged, 
but it is to be evaluated by social norms. The analysis thus re-
tains subtlety, but at the cost of indeterminacy. Content can be 
given to the operation of these two principles only by a more 
precise examination of their applicability in a particular context. 
In Chapter II, Hurst describes legal decision-makers with a 
realist's emphasis upon legislatures and administrative agencies. 
In Chapter ill, he turns his attention to the substance of legal 
11. Hurst, Legal History: A Research Program, 1942 Wis. L. R.Ev. 323. 
12. LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 4, at 45. 
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decisions, in particular to the relationship between science and 
technology and the law. The choice of this topic-the relationship 
between man and his environment-to introduce the treatment 
of substantive law itself recapitulates the evolution of Hurst's 
publications.13 This approach generally emphasizes the technical 
and technological rather than the political content of the prob-
lems legal agencies face. 
Hurst in general thinks that bad decisions are not caused by 
favoritism or political preference, so much as by a lack of infor-
mation and foresight. For him, the opposite of consensus is drift 
and inertia; the opposite of agreement is not disagreement, but 
ignorance and confusion. He criticizes courts because they easily 
lose sight of affected interests not represented by the opposing 
parties, and he criticizes legislatures for not gathering informa-
tion as well as they could. 
Hurst is most critical of nineteenth-century law for its failure 
to overcome a contemporary tendency to favor short-run results 
at the expense of long-run interests, an attitude he describes as 
"bastard pragmatism." Law is not autonomous; its task is not to 
make society's choices but, in a role similar to that given econom-
ics by many of its modern practitioners, it is at least to make 
society aware of the true costs involved in its choices.14 H, as 
Hurst argues, law is a method for the national exploitation of the 
physical environment, difficult problems of distributional choice 
can be avoided as long as productivity is increased. Hurst finds 
this technique has typified American law in general; it is an ap-
proach of which he apparently approves.15 To the extent that 
social conflicts-the confrontation of groups-erupt, they are 
implicit generational ones, as bastard pragmatists with a short-
run view impose costs upon their descendants; they are not con-
temporaneous social divisions, which are explicit and articulated. 
In its first three chapters, Law and Social Order clearly 
tracks Hurst's earlier work, presenting it in summary form. In the 
13. In LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 1, Hurst analyzed in detail the effect 
of law on the exploitation of Wisconsin's timber resources in the nineteenth century. 
14. Here, again, Hurst reflects his realist heritage. For the realists, it was easy to 
announce that law should reflect contemporary values when the Supreme Court was, in 
some celebrated cases, rejecting such values as expressed in legislative decisions and 
instead enacting "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." The extent to which law could 
be used to initiate change, not to reflect a social consensus, but to create one, was a subject 
on which realists remained ambiguous and tentative. 
15. In this context Hart and Sacks discuss the fallacy of the static pie. On the relation 
between Hurst and what loosely can be called the legal-process school, see Tushnet, 
Lumber and the Legal Process, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 114, 115 n.7. 
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final chapter, "Consensus and Conflict," Hurst looks not at the 
relationship between man and his environment, but at relations 
between groups of men. The emphasis, of necessity, is less on 
technology and more on politics. This is new, a substitution of 
consensus-conflict for the consensus-inertia polarity that Hurst 
employed in the past. There is at least now the suggestion that 
profound disagreement rather than haste, inadvertence, or igno-
rance might sometimes explain the failure to consider what Hurst 
would deem all of the relevant factors in reaching·a decision. 
This chapter appears to be Hurst's response to criticism that 
he has exaggerated the element of consensus in American history, 
that he has written the victors' view of history, and failed to 
consider contemporary opposition to the nineteenth-century use 
of law to facilitate market capitalism and generate economic 
growth. Hurst may in particular have been reacting to Morton 
Horwitz's The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 
(1977). 16 Horwitz explores much of the same ground as 
Hurst-the relation between law and the economy in the nine-
teenth century-but appears to offer a very different interpreta-
tion, one which, according to Hurst, stresses conflict rather than 
consensus. 17 
While Hurst has now formally recognized conflict as a possi-
ble explanation of various aspects of American society and of its 
law, he is actually much more confident in and comfortable with 
a consensus approach. It is not simply that Hurst believes that 
American development has been dominated by a consensus on 
middle-class values.18 That is a substantive conclusion which may 
well be justified; it is, at any rate, one that is shared by many 
others. Hurst, however, goes further; his. very definition of 
"consensus" almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that con-
sensus has dominated the American experience. Consensus, as 
used by Hurst, included situations in which there is disagree-
ment, or no agreement; it can comprehend near-unanimity of 
sentiment and the absence of strong disagreement. Given Hurst's 
terminology, there appears to be no issue so divisive it cannot be 
described as demonstrating a consensus of a sort. When discus-
sing state abandonment of corporate regulation in the late nine-
16. While both books were published in 1977, many chapters of Horwitz's book had 
earlier appeared in various journals and the thrust of his argument was certainly well-
known to Hurst at the time he delivered the lectures at Cornell, in April 1976, which later 
became LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 4. 
17. See Hurst, Book Review, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 175 (1977). 
18. See LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 4, at 43-44, 64. 
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teenth century and interstate rivalry, especially between Dela-
ware and New Jersey to be corporate refuges, Hurst refers to an 
"evident prevailing consensus" on this issue.19 He apparently 
cannot fully accept the existence of a widely shared confidence 
in unrestrained corporate activity. There is, after all, well-known 
nonlegal muckraking and trust-busting literature that clearly 
suggests disagreement on the issue of corporate power. The ac-
tions of the federal government also suggest that state laws did 
not reflect a unanimity of approach.20 
Although Hurst seems more comfortable focusing upon con-
sensus, he does maintain that many situations in American law 
reflected varying degrees of both consensus and conflict. Laws to 
regulate hunting emerged, he suggests, from the pressures exerted 
by hunters and in the absence of any clear expression of view by 
those not directly concerned.21 In effect, hunting laws exemplified 
what Hurst has generally called inertia and drift. Hurst then 
presents the case of competition between railroad and trucking 
interests, as the former attempted to thwart the latter's requests 
for authorization to carry larger loads. There were clear adver-
saries here and it was thus less likely that a decision would result 
from drift, from a failure to have its possible adverse conse-
quences clearly articulated. What conflicts existed, however, 
were between two parties competing in a game, the rules of which 
they both accepted. They did not criticize the game itself. Hurst 
describes this as a situation in which there were adversarial inter-
ests, but a consensus that the legal processes should resolve the 
issue. Any litigation would, by this standard, apparently reflect 
both conflict and consensus. 
Hurst writes of antitrust law at greater length. There, the 
acceptance of the rules of the game is more problematic. He de-
scribes the alteration in American policy between efforts to max-
imize competition and to increase economic stability. He refers 
also to the strong political component, which feared the accumu-
lation of power in private hands, in some antitrust sentiment. He 
19. Id. at 242. 
20. Hurst suggests that consensus is demonstrated by the fact that all states aban-
doned regulatory efforts. The absence of regulation in any one state, however, (in an 
application, in effect, of Gresham's law to this subject) made such regulation impossible 
in any other state. Moreover, even if the abandonment of regulation was a truly indepen-
dent decision in each state, this does not mean that, within each state, there was not still 
significant opposition. Hurst sometimes suggests that continuity demonstrates consensus, 
and, at other times, admits the fact of power and the possibility of a consensus only among 
the victors. Id. at 220. 
21. Id. at 215. 
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states that these political, "balance-of-power" views were "not 
rejected in a clear-cut debate between political and economic 
priorities, but rather -[were] lost to sight in an opportunistic, 
unplanned course of action by those charged with enforcing the 
antitrust laws."22 Here, again, what appears to be "conflict" turns 
out to be "inertia." Hurst concludes that forty years of antitrust 
law failed to evolve into a "reasonably definite and coherent set 
of ideas with a firm base in popular understanding and accept-
ance. "23 The consensus was "ambiguous."24 It may be simply a 
matter of point of view whether one describes a glass as half 
empty or half full; Hurst, at any rate, prefers to find, not disa-
greement, but the failure to reach agreement. 
Hurst prefers to discuss issues in which the question of redis-
tribution is muted and can be avoided by a strategy of enlarging 
the pie rather than redividing the shares; he avoids those issues 
which, in a zero-sum world, must have both winners and losers. 
He devotes almost no attention to labor law, finding little of it in 
the nineteenth century because "the times had to ripen for effec-
tive legal intervention, "25 an explanation that obviously skirts the 
issues of power and class conflict. What conflict existed Hurst 
sees as part of a larger consensus; twentieth-century labor law 
enforced collective bargaining, reflecting, he feels, a consensus in 
favor of "limited, generally peaceful conflict."26 Hurst also has 
almost nothing to say in this chapter about taxation; elsewhere 
in the book, he does briefly describe conflict over the extent to 
which taxation should redistribute wealth. Here, again, the con-
flict is part of a larger consensus. "[C]onflict seems to be over 
the extent and conditions of such transfer payments, not over the 
legitimacy of government use of its resource-allocating authority 
to some extent to increase the life options of individuals of small 
means."27 
Every legal doctrine, every institutional statement or pattern 
of behavior can be viewed as expressing consensus, a shared be-
lief, either a homogeneous response or a conscious compro~ise. 
It can, on the other hand, be seen as mediating an underlying 
22. Id. at 265. 
23. Id. at 257. 
24. Id. at 263. 
25. Id. at 46. 
26. Id. at 236. 
27. Id. at 122. Hurst ignores issues like suffrage, apportionment, and prohibition, on 
which disagreement was fundamental and no solution could satisfy everyone. See Schei-
ber, supra note 8, at 752-53. 
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contradiction, as attempting to reconcile or hide a potential con-
flict. 
Hurst believes that one of law's primary purposes is to pro-
vide society with the information necessary for informed choice, 
to force it, for instance, to consider its long-run as well as its 
immediate interests. Law in Wisconsin failed, as Hurst so thor-
oughly explained in Law and Economic Growth, when it let the 
lumber industry destroy itself by thoughtless overcutting. Im-
plicit in Hurst's criticism of ·law's failure in this regard is the 
belief that, when the costs of activities are revealed, a consensus 
responsive to the additional considerations will evolve. But con-
flict may be more deep-seated, based not on misinformation, but 
on well-founded perceptions of opposed interests. At such a time, 
a choice between the opposed groups must be made; in such a 
circumstance, law's task in reducing social conflict may become 
not to reveal where the possible sources of conflict lie, but rather 
to hide these social seams, to submerge group conflict, letting 
groups and individuals live comfortably with others and with 
themselves, without resolving apparently irreconcilable, but not 
fatal, conflicts of interest or contradictions in ideology.28 
Whether American law reflects consensus or conflict is a 
question whose answer may very well reveal more about the au-
thor than the subject. Consensus and conflict are as likely to be 
approaches to a topic as descriptions of it. Hurst's present inter-
est in consensus and conflict, and his influence within the disci-
pline, suggest that there is a danger that American legal histori-
ans, perhaps with Hurst and Horwitz as the standard-bearers, 
will now debate the relative merits of these two paradigms. 
It will be particularly easy to be adversarial since American 
historians have relatively recently engaged in just such a contro-
versy. For several decades, they disputed the merits of consensus 
and conflict as descriptions of the American experience.2g 
"Progressive historians" and their progeny discovered repeated 
conflict between classes and masses, between the special interests 
of property and the principles of egalitarian democracy. They 
have portrayed the Jeffersonians, the Populists, the Progressives, 
and the New Dealers as recurrent challengers to the asserted 
privileges of the propertied. For such scholars, American history 
has been discontinuous, as one side or the other, justifying itself 
28. This point has been made by Gordon, supra note 10, at 53, among others. 
29. See, J. HIGHAM, HISTORY 171-232 (1965). 
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on ideological grounds, seized power in what were called revolu-
tions:30 the War for Independence, the Constitutional Conven-
tion, Jacksonian Democracy, the Civil War, and the New Deal, 
among others. 
"Consensus historians," on the other hand, have emphasized 
continuity and stability in the American experience. They have 
seen American politics, not as the battleground in a struggle be-
tween the propertied and the masses, but as an expression of 
middle-class values which were shared by most of the population. 
Disputes were pragmatic, not ideological; outsiders demanded 
equal opportunity, but not a restructuring of society. 
It would be particularly unfortunate for legal historians to 
recr~ate this debate. It obscures, by the rhetorical excesses it 
generates, the similarity between Hurst and Horwitz. For both 
historians, the major achievement of°nineteenth-century law was 
the creation of a system of market capitalism. While Horwitz is 
more explicitly critical of this result, Hurst does not accord it 
unqualified approval: "bastard pragmatism" is, after all, hardly 
a term of approbation. And while Hurst does not claim that what 
happened was good for everyone, Horwitz does not actually ac-
cuse law-makers of disingenuousness in appealing to the public 
good as a criterion of decision. Much of the divergence between 
them reflects differing evaluations of the extent of ideological 
opposition to the prevailing ethos. Both, moreover, generally 
limit their researches to legal materials. Hurst does not look to 
literature, or to sermons, for instance, to see if they reveal atti-
tudes about individualism or economic growth similar to those 
expressed in legal materials, an investigation which might help 
corroborate his claim that law in these regards simply reflected 
popular values. Horwitz does not examine the hard economic 
data that might demonstrate the extent to which law did affect 
economic growth or the distribution of wealth. 31 
With so much of American legal history still unexplored, it 
is tempting to over-generalize: to assume the representative na-
30. These might just as easily be called "transformations." This is the kind of conflict 
that Horwitz describes, but Hurst rejects. 
31. See Williams, Book Review, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1187, 1210-14 (1978). Both Hurst 
and Horwitz also tend to use regional materials to make generalizations about the entire 
nation. In his review of Horwitz, (Hurst, supra note 17, at 176), Hurst notes that Horwitz 
focuses on the eastern seaboard, especially the middle and New England states. Hurst 
himself has been criticized for taking Wisconsin, especially considering that state's refusal 
to undertake internal improvements directly, as representative of the United States in 
general. See Scheiber, supra note 8, at 753. 
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ture of a relatively narrow body of primary materials or to support 
large abstractions on a fragile base. 
A debate over consensus and conflict is particularly vulner-
able to such over-generalization because the legal historian can 
too easily borrow an already developed rhetoric. Consensus and 
conflict are certainly not inappropriate categories of analysis and 
it may even be that one or the other best describes the character 
of American legal history, but much careful and particularized 
research is needed to confirm such a judgment. Moreover, con-
sensus and conflict are only appropriate categories; they are not 
the only categories and it would be unfortunate to ignore the 
possibility of different theoretical structures. Hurst himself 
concludes that consensus and conflict are both present in most 
situations and implies that efforts would better be spent exam-
ining agreement, conflict, compromise, and inertia in particular 
circumstances. Such exhortations for future research are useful, 
but are needed less than is the research itself, the kind that 
Hurst has in the past so impressively produced. 
